I. MEANING OF REVELATION

                     Revelation may be defined as the communication of some truth by God to a
                     rational creature through means which are beyond the ordinary course of nature.
                     The truths revealed may be such as are otherwise inaccessible to the human
                     mind -- mysteries, which even when revealed, the intellect of man is incapable of
                     fully penetrating. But Revelation is not restricted to these. God may see fit to
                     employ supernatural means to affirm truths, the discovery of which is not per se
                     beyond the powers of reason. The essence of Revelation lies in the fact that it is
                     the direct speech of God to man. The mode of communication, however, may be
                     mediate. Revelation does not cease to be such if God's message is delivered to
                     us by a prophet, who alone is the recipient of the immediate communication.
                     Such in brief is the account of Revelation given in the Constitution "De Fide
                     Catholica" of the Vatican Council. The Decree "Lamentabili" (3 July, 1907), by its
                     condemnation of a contrary proposition, declares that the dogmas which the
                     Church proposes as revealed are "truths which have come down to us from
                     heaven" (veritates e coelo delapsoe) and not "an interpretation of religious facts
                     which the human mind has acquired by its own strenuous efforts" (prop., 22). It
                     will be seen that Revelation as thus explained differs clearly from:

                          inspiration such as is bestowed by God on the author of a sacred book;
                          for this, while involving a special illumination of the mind in virtue of which
                          the recipient conceives such thoughts as God desires him to commit to
                          writing, does not necessarily suppose a supernatural communication of
                          these truths;
                          from the illustrations which God may bestow from time to time upon any
                          of the faithful to bring home to the mind the import of some truth of religion
                          hitherto obscurely grasped; and,
                          from the Divine assistance by which the pope when acting as the
                          supreme teacher of the Church, is preserved from all error as to faith or
                          morals. The function of this assistance is purely negative: it need not
                          carry with it any positive gift of light to the mind. Much of the confusion in
                          which the discussion of Revelation in non-Catholic works is involved arises
                          from the neglect to distinguish it from one or other of these.

                     During the past century the Church has been called on to reject as erroneous
                     several views of Revelation irreconcilable with Catholic belief. Three of these may
                     here be noted.

                          The view of Anton Guenther (1783 1863). This writer denied that Revelation
                          could include mysteries strictly so-called, inasmuch as the human
                          intellect is capable of penetrating to the full all revealed truth. He taught,
                          further, that the meaning to be attached to revealed doctrines is
                          undergoing constant change as human knowledge grows and man's mind
                          develops; so that the dogmatic formul which are now true will gradually
                          cease to be so. His writings were put on the Index in 1857, and his
                          erroneous propositions definitively condemned in the decrees of the
                          Vatican Council.
                          the Modernist view (Loisy, Tyrrell). According to this school, there is no
                          such thing as Revelation in the sense of a direct communication from God
                          to man. The human soul reaching up towards the unknowable God is ever
                          endeavouring to interpret its sentiments in intellectual formul . The formul
                          it thus frames are our ecclesiastical dogmas. These can but symbolize
                          the Unknowable; they can give us no real knowledge regarding it. Such an
                          error is manifestly subversive of all belief, and was explicitly condemned
                          by the Decree "Lamentabili" and the Encyclical "Pascendi" (8 Sept.,
                          With the view just mentioned is closely connected the Pragmatist view of
                          M. Leroy ("Dogme et Critique", Paris, 2nd ed. 1907). Like the Modernists,
                          he sees in revealed dogmas simply the results of spiritual experience, but
                          holds their value to lie not in the fact that they symbolize the Unknowable,
                          but that they have practical value in pointing the way by which we may
                          best enjoy experience of the Divine. This view was condemned in the
                          same documents as the last mentioned.

                                      II. POSSIBILITY OF REVELATION

                     The possibility of Revelation as above explained has been strenuously denied
                     from various points of view during the last century. For this reason the Church
                     held it necessary to issue special decrees on the subject in the Vatican Council.
                     Its antagonists may be divided into two classes according to the different
                     standpoints from which they direct their attack, viz:

                          Rationalists (under this class we include both Deist and Agnostic writers).
                          Those who adopt this standpoint rely in the main on two fundamental
                          objections: they either urge that the miraculous is impossible, and that
                          Revelation involves miraculous interposition on the part of the Deity; or
                          they appeal to the autonomy of reason, which it is maintained can only
                          accept as truths the results of its own activities.
                          Immanentists. To this class may be assigned all those whose objections
                          are based on Kantian and Hegelian doctrines as to the subjective
                          character of all our knowledge. The views of these writers frequently
                          involve a purely pantheistic doctrine. But even those who repudiate
                          pantheism, in place of the personal God, Ruler, and Judge of the world,
                          whom Christianity teaches, substitute the vague notion of the "Spirit"
                          immanent in all men, and regard all religious creeds as the attempts of
                          the human soul to find expression for its inward experience. Hence no
                          religion, whether pagan or Christian, is wholly false; but none can claim to
                          be a message from God free from any admixture of error. (Cf. Sabatier,
                          "Esquisse", etc., Bk. I, cap. ii.) Here too the autonomy of reason is
                          invoked as fatal to the doctrine of Revelation properly so called. In the face
                          of these objections, it is evident that the question of the possibility of
                          Revelation is at present one of the most vital portions of Christian

                     If the existence of a personal God be once established, the physical possibility
                     at least of Revelation is undeniable. God, who has endowed man with means to
                     communicate his thoughts to his fellows, cannot be destitute of the power to
                     communicate His own thoughts to us. [Martineau, it is true, denies that we
                     possess faculties either to receive or to authenticate a divine revelation
                     concerning the past or the future (Seat of Authority in Religion, p. 311); but such
                     an assertion is arbitrary and extravagant in the extreme.] However, numerous
                     difficulties have been urged on grounds other than that of physical possibility. In
                     estimating their value it seems desirable to distinguish three aspects of
                     Revelation, viz: as it makes known to us;

                          (1) truths of the natural law,
                          (2) mysteries of the faith,
                          (3) positive precepts, e.g. regarding Divine worship.

                     (1) The revelation of truths of the natural law is certainly not inconsistent with
                     God's wisdom. God so created man as to bestow on him endowments amply
                     sufficient for him to attain his last end. Had it been otherwise, the creation would
                     have been imperfect. If over and above this He decreed to make the attainment of
                     beatitude yet easier for man by placing within his reach a far simpler and far
                     more certain way of knowing the law on the observance of which his fate
                     depended, this is an argument for the Divine generosity; it does not disprove the
                     Divine wisdom. To assume, with certain Rationalists, that exceptional
                     intervention can only be explained on the ground that God was unable to
                     embrace His ultimate design in His original scheme is a mere petitio principii.
                     Further, the doctrine of original sin supplies an additional reason for such a
                     revelation of the natural law. That doctrine teaches us that man by the abuse of
                     his free will has rendered his attainment of salvation difficult. Though his
                     intellectual faculties are not radically vitiated, yet his grasp of truth is weakened;
                     his recognition of the moral law is constantly clouded by doubts and
                     questionings. Revelation gives to his mind the certainty he had lost, and so far
                     repairs the evils consequent on the catastrophe which had befallen him.

                     (2) Still more difficulty has been felt regarding mysteries. It is freely asserted that
                     a mystery is something repugnant to reason, and therefore something
                     intrinsically impossible. This objection rests on a mere misunderstanding of what
                     is signified by a mystery. In theological terminology a conception involves a
                     mystery when it is such that the natural faculties of the mind are unable to see
                     how its elements can coalesce. This does not imply anything contrary to reason.
                     A conception is only contrary to reason when the mind can recognize that its
                     elements are mutually exclusive, and therefore involve a contradiction in terms. A
                     more subtle objection is that urged by Dr. J. Caird, to the effect that every truth
                     that can be partially communicated to the mind by analogies is ultimately
                     capable of being fully grasped by the understanding. "Of all such representations,
                     unless they are purely illusory, it must hold good that implicitly and in
                     undeveloped form they contain rational thought and therefore thought which
                     human intelligence may ultimately free from its sensuous veil. . . . Nothing that is
                     absolutely inscrutable to reason can be made known to faith" (Philosophy of
                     Religion, p. 71). The objection rests on a wholly exaggerated view regarding the
                     powers of the human intellect. The cognitive faculty of any nature is proportionate
                     to its grade in the scale of being. The intelligence of a finite intellect can only
                     penetrate a finite object; it is incapable of comprehending the Infinite. The finite
                     types through which the Infinite is made known to it can never under any
                     circumstances lead to more than analogous knowledge. It is further frequently
                     urged that the revelation of what the mind cannot understand would be an act of
                     violence to the intellect; and that this faculty can only accept those truths whose
                     intrinsic reasonableness it recognizes. This assertion, based on the alleged
                     autonomy of reason, can only be met with denial. The function of the intellect is
                     to recognize and admit any truth which is adequately presented to it, whether
                     that truth be guaranteed by internal or by external criteria. The reason is not
                     deprived of its legitimate activity because the criteria are external. It finds ample
                     scope in weighing the arguments for the credibility of the fact asserted. The
                     existence of mysteries in the Christian religion was expressly taught by the
                     Vatican Council (De Fide Cath., cap. ii, can. ii). "If anyone shall say that no
                     mysteries properly so called are contained in the Divine revelation, but that all the
                     dogmas of the faith can be understood and proved from natural principles by
                     human reason duly cultivated -- let him be anathema."

                     (3) The older (Deist) School of Rationalists denied the possibility of a Divine
                     revelation imposing any laws other than those which natural religion enjoins on
                     man. These writers regarded natural religion as, so to speak, a political
                     constitution determining the Divine government of the universe, and held that God
                     could only act as its terms prescribed. This error likewise was proscribed at the
                     same time (De Fide Cath., cap. ii, can. ii). "If any one shall say that it is
                     impossible or that it is inexpedient that man should be instructed regarding God
                     and the worship to be paid to Him by Divine revelation -- let him be anathema."

                     It can hardly be questioned that the "autonomy of reasons" furnishes the main
                     source of the difficulties at present felt against Revelation in the Christian sense.
                     It seems desirable to indicate very briefly the various ways in which that principle
                     is understood. It is explained by M. Blondel, an eminent member of the
                     Immanentist School, as signifying that "nothing can enter into a man which does
                     not proceed from him, and which does not correspond in some manner to an
                     interior need of expansion; and that neither in the sphere of historic facts nor of
                     traditional doctrine, nor of commands imposed by authority, can any truth rank
                     as valid for a man or any precept as obligatory, unless it be in some way
                     autonomous and autochthonous" (Lettre sur les exigences, etc., p. 601).
                     Although M. Blondel has in his own case reconciled this principle with the
                     acceptance of Catholic belief, yet it may readily be seen that it affords an easy
                     ground for the denial not merely of the possibility of external Revelation, but of
                     the whole historic basis of Christianity. The origin of this erroneous doctrine is to
                     be found in the fact that within the sphere of the natural speculative reason,
                     truths which are received purely on external authority, and which are in no way
                     connected with principles already admitted, can scarcely be said to form part of
                     our knowledge. Science asks for the inner reason of things and can make no use
                     of truths save in so far as it can reach the principles from which they flow. The
                     extension of this to religious truths is an error directly traceable to the
                     assumption of the eighteenth-century philosophers that there are no religious
                     truths save those which the human intellect can attain unaided. The principle is,
                     however, sometimes applied with a less extensive signification. It may be
                     understood to involve no more than that reason cannot be compelled to admit
                     any religious doctrine or any moral obligation merely because they possess
                     extrinsic guarantees of truth; they must in every case be able to justify their
                     validity on intrinsic grounds. Thus Prof. J. Caird writes: "Neither moral nor
                     religious ideas can be simply transferred to the human spirit in the form of fact,
                     nor can they be verified by any evidence outside of or lower than themselves"
                     (Fundamental Ideas of Christianity, p. 31). A somewhat different meaning again
                     is implied in the canon of the Vatican Council in which the right of the intellect to
                     claim absolute independence (autonomy) is denied. "If anyone shall say that
                     human reason is independent in such wise that faith cannot be commanded it by
                     God -- let him be anathema" (De Fide Cath., cap. iii, can. i). This canon is
                     directed against the position maintained as already noted by the older
                     Rationalists and the Deists, that human reason is amply sufficient without
                     exterior assistance to attain to absolute truth in all matters of religion (cf. Vacant,
                     "Etudes Théologiques", I, 572; II, 387).

                                      III. NECESSITY OF REVELATION

                     Can it be said that Revelation is necessary to man? There can be no question as
                     to its necessity, if it be admitted that God destines man to attain a supernatural
                     beatitude which surpasses the exigencies of his natural endowments. In that
                     case God must needs reveal alike the existence of that supernatural end and the
                     means by which we are to attain it. But is Revelation necessary even in order
                     that man should observe the precepts of the natural law? If our race be viewed in
                     its present condition as history displays it, the answer can only be that it is,
                     morally speaking, impossible for men unassisted by Revelation, to attain by their
                     natural powers such a knowledge of that law as is sufficient to the right ordering
                     of life. In other words, Revelation is morally necessary. Absolute necessity we do
                     not assert. Man, Catholic theology teaches, possesses the requisite faculties to
                     discover the natural law. Luther indeed asserted that man's intellect had become
                     hopelessly obscured by original sin, so that even natural truth was beyond his
                     reach. And the Traditionalists of the nineteenth century (Bautain, Bonnetty, etc.)
                     also fell into error, teaching that man was incapable of arriving at moral and
                     religious truth apart from Revelation. The Church, on the contrary, recognizes the
                     capacity of human reason and grants that here and there pagans may have
                     existed, who had freed themselves from prevalent errors, and who had attained to
                     such a knowledge of the natural law as would suffice to guide them to the
                     attainment of beatitude. But she teaches nevertheless that this can only be the
                     case as regards a few, and that for the bulk of mankind Revelation is necessary.
                     That this is so may be shown both from the facts of history and from the nature
                     of the case. As regards the testimony of history, it is notorious that even the
                     most civilized of pagan races have fallen into the grossest errors regarding the
                     natural law; and from these it may safely be asserted they would never have
                     emerged. Certainly the schools of philosophy would not have enabled them to do
                     so; for many of these denied even such fundamental principles of the natural law
                     as the personality of God and the freedom of the will. Again, by the very nature of
                     the case, the difficulties involved in the attainment of the requisite knowledge are
                     insuperable. For men to be able to attain such a knowledge of the natural law as
                     will enable them to order their lives rightly, the truths of that law must be so plain
                     that the mass of men can discover them without long delay, and possess a
                     knowledge of them which will be alike free from uncertainty and secure from
                     serious error. No reasonable man will maintain that in the case of the greater part
                     of mankind this is possible. Even the most vital truths are called in question and
                     are met by serious objections. The separation of truth from error is a work
                     involving time and labour. For this the majority of men have neither inclination nor
                     opportunity. Apart from the security which Revelation gives they would reject an
                     obligation both irksome and uncertain. It results that a revelation even of the
                     natural law is for man in his present state a moral necessity.

                                       IV. CRITERIA OF REVELATION

                     The fact that Revelation is not merely possible but morally necessary is in itself a
                     strong argument for the existence of a revelation, and imposes on all men the
                     strict obligation of examining the credentials of a religion which presents itself
                     with prima facie marks of truth. On the other hand if God has conferred a
                     revelation on men, it stands to reason that He must have attached to it plain and
                     evident criteria enabling even the unlettered to recognize His message for what it
                     is, and to distinguish it from all false claimants.

                     The criteria of Revelation are either external or internal: (1) External criteria
                     consist in certain signs attached to the revelation as a divine testimony to its
                     truth, ee.g., miracles. (2) Internal criteria are those which are found in the nature
                     of the doctrine itself in the manner in which it was presented to the world, and in
                     the effects which it produces on the soul. These are distinguished into negative
                     and positive criteria. (a) The immunity of the alleged revelation from any teaching,
                     speculative or moral, which is manifestly erroneous or self-contradictory, the
                     absence of all fraud on the part of those who deliver it to the world, provide
                     negative internal criteria. (b) Positive internal criteria are of various kinds. One
                     such is found in the beneficent effects of the doctrine and in its power to meet
                     even the highest aspirations which man can frame. Another consists in the
                     internal conviction felt by the soul as to the truth of the doctrine (Suarez, "De
                     Fide", IV, sect. 5, n. 9.) In the last century there was in certain schools of
                     thought a manifest tendency to deny the value of all external criteria. This was
                     largely due to the Rationalist polemic against miracles. Not a few non-Catholic
                     divines anxious to make terms with the enemy adopted this attitude. They
                     allowed that miracles are useless as a foundation for faith, and that they form on
                     the contrary one of the chief difficulties which lie in faith's path. Faith, they
                     admitted, must be presupposed before the miracle can be accepted. Hence
                     these writers held the sole criterion of faith to lie in inward experience -- in the
                     testimony of the Spirit. Thus Schleiermacher says: "We renounce altogether any
                     attempt to demonstrate the truth and the necessity of the Christian religion. On
                     the contrary we assume that every Christian before he commences inquiries of
                     this kind is already convinced that no other form of religion but the Christian can
                     harmonize with his piety" (Glaubenslehre, n. 11). The Traditionalists by denying
                     the power of human reason to test the grounds of faith were driven to fall back on
                     the same criterion (cf. Lamennais, "Pensées Diverses", p. 488).

                     This position is altogether untenable. The testimony afforded by inward
                     experience is undoubtedly not to be neglected. Catholic doctors have always
                     recognized its value. But its force is limited to the individual who is the subject of
                     it. It cannot be employed as a criterion valid for all; for its absence is no proof
                     that the doctrine is not true. Moreover, of all the criteria it is the one with regard
                     to which there is most possibility of deception. When truth mingled with error is
                     presented to the mind, it often happens that the whole teaching, false and true
                     alike, is believed to have a Divine guarantee, because the soul has recognized
                     and welcomed the truth of some one doctrine, e.g., the Atonement. Taken alone
                     and apart from objective proof it conveys but a probability that the revelation is
                     true. Hence the Vatican Council expressly condemns the error of those who
                     teach it to be the only criterion (De Fide Cath., cap. iii, can. iii).

                     The perfect agreement of a religious doctrine with the teachings of reason and
                     natural law, its power to satisfy, and more than satisfy, the highest aspirations of
                     man, its beneficent influence both as regards public and private life, provide us
                     with a more trustworthy test. This is a criterion which has often been applied with
                     great force on behalf of the claims of the Catholic Church to be the sole guardian
                     of God's Revelation. These qualities indeed appertain in so transcendent a
                     degree to the teaching of the Church, that the argument must needs carry
                     conviction to an earnest and truth-seeking mind. Another criterion which at first
                     sight bears some resemblance to this claims a mention here. It is based upon
                     the theory of Immanence and has of recent years been strenuously advocated by
                     certain of the less extreme members of the Modernist School. These writers urge
                     that the vital needs of the soul imperatively demand, as their necessary
                     complement, Divine co-operation, supernatural grace, and even the supreme
                     magisterium of the Church. To these needs the Catholic religion alone
                     corresponds. And this correspondence with our vital needs is, they hold, the one
                     sure criterion of truth. The theory is altogether inconsistent with Catholic dogma.
                     It supposes that the Christian Revelation and the gift of grace are not free gifts
                     from God, but something of which the nature of man is absolutely exigent; and
                     without which it would be incomplete. It is a return to the errors of Baius. (Denz.
                     1021, etc.)

                     While the Church, as we have said, is far from undervaluing internal criteria, she
                     has always regarded external criteria as the most easily recognizable and the
                     most decisive. Hence the Vatican Council teaches: "In order that the obedience
                     of our faith might be agreeable to reason, God has willed that to the internal aids
                     of the Holy Spirit, there should be joined external proofs of His Revelation, viz:
                     Divine works (facta divina), especially miracles and prophecy, which inasmuch
                     as they manifestly display the omnipotence and the omniscience of God are
                     most certain signs of a Divine revelation and are suited to the understanding of
                     all" (De Fide Cath., cap. iii). As an instance of a work evidently Divine and yet
                     other than miracle or prophecy, the council instances the Catholic Church,
                     which, "by reason of the marvellous manner of its propagation, its surprising
                     sanctity, its inexhaustible fruitfulness in all good works, its catholic unity and its
                     invincible stability, is a mighty and perpetual motive of credibility and an
                     irrefragable testimony to its own divine legation" (l. c.). The truth of the teaching
                     of the council regarding external criteria is plain to any unprejudiced mind.
                     Granted the presence of the negative criteria, external guarantees establish the
                     Divine origin of a revelation as nothing else can do. They are, so to say, a seal
                     affixed by the hand of God Himself, and authenticating the work as His. (For a
                     fuller treatment of their apologetic value, and for a discussion of objections, see
                     MIRACLES; APOLOGETICS.)

                                      V. THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION

                     It remains here to distinguish the Christian Revelation or "deposit of faith" from
                     what are termed private revelations. This distinction is of importance: for while the
                     Church recognizes that God has spoken to His servants in every age, and still
                     continues thus to favour chosen souls, she is careful to distinguish these
                     revelations from the Revelation which has been committed to her charge, and
                     which she proposes to all her members for their acceptance. That Revelation was
                     given in its entirety to Our Lord and His Apostles. After the death of the last of
                     the twelve it could receive no increment. It was, as the Church calls it, a deposit
                     -- "the faith once delivered to the saints" (Jude, 2) -- for which the Church was to
                     "contend" but to which she could add nothing. Thus, whenever there has been
                     question of defining a doctrine, whether at Nicæa, at Trent, or at the Vatican, the
                     sole point of debate has been as to whether the doctrine is found in Scripture or
                     in Apostolic tradition. The gift of Divine assistance (see I), sometimes
                     confounded with Revelation by the less instructed of anti-Catholic writers, merely
                     preserves the supreme pontiff from error in defining the faith; it does not enable
                     him to add jot or tittle to it. All subsequent revelations conferred by God are
                     known as private revelations, for the reason that they are not directed to the
                     whole Church but are for the good of individual members alone, They may indeed
                     be a legitimate object for our faith; but that will depend on the evidence in each
                     particular case. The Church does not propose them to us as part of her
                     message. It is true that in certain cases she has given her approbation to certain
                     private revelations. This, however, only signifies:

                          that there is nothing in them contrary to the Catholic Faith or to the moral
                          law, and,
                          that there are sufficient indications of their truth to justify the faithful in
                          attaching credence to them without being guilty of superstition or of

                     It may however be further asked, whether the Christian Revelation does not
                     receive increment through the development of doctrine. During the last half of the
                     nineteenth century the question of doctrinal development was widely debated.
                     Owing to Guenther's erroneous teaching that the doctrines of the faith assume a
                     new sense as human science progresses, the Vatican Council declared once for
                     all that the meaning of the Church's dogmas is immutable (De Fide Cath., cap.
                     iv, can. iii). On the other hand it explicitly recognizes that there is a legitimate
                     mode of development, and cites to that effect (op. cit., cap. iv) the words of
                     Vincent of Lirins: "Let understanding science and wisdom [regarding the Church's
                     doctrine] progress and make large increase in each and in all, in the individual
                     and in the whole Church, as ages and centuries advance: but let it be solely in
                     its own order, retaining, that is, the same dogma, the same sense, the same
                     import" (Commonit. 28). Two of the most eminent theological writers of the
                     period, Cardinal Franzelin and Cardinal Newman, have on very different lines dealt
                     with the progress and nature of this development. Cardinal Franzelin in his "De
                     Divina Traditione et Scriptura" (pt. XXII VI) has principally in view the Hegelian
                     theories of Guenther. He consequently lays the chief stress on the identity at all
                     points of the intellectual datum, and explains development almost exclusively as
                     a process of logical deduction. Cardinal Newman wrote his "Essay on the
                     Development of Christian Doctrine" in the course of the two years (1843 45)
                     immediately preceding his reception into the Catholic Church. He was called on
                     to deal with different adversaries, viz., the Protestants who justified their
                     separation from the main body of Christians on the ground that Rome had
                     corrupted primitive teaching by a series of additions. In that work he examines in
                     detail the difference between a corruption and a development. He shows how a
                     true and fertile idea is endowed with a vital and assimilative energy of its own, in
                     virtue of which, without undergoing the least substantive change, it attains to an
                     ever completer expression, as the course of time brings it into contact with new
                     aspects of truth or forces it into collision with new errors: the life of the idea is
                     shown to be analogous to an organic development. He provides a series of tests
                     distinguishing a true development from a corruption, chief among them being the
                     preservation of type, and the continuity of principles; and then, applying the tests
                     to the case of the additions of Roman teaching, shows that these have the marks
                     not of corruptions but of true and legitimate developments. The theory, though
                     less scholastic in its form than that of Franzelin, is in perfect conformity with
                     orthodox belief. Newman no less than his Jesuit contemporary teaches that the
                     whole doctrine, alike in its later as in its earlier forms, was contained in the
                     original revelation given to the Church by Our Lord and His Apostles, and that its
                     identity is guaranteed to us by the infallible magisterium of the Church. The claim
                     of certain Modernist writers that their views on the evolution of dogma were
                     connected with Newman's theory of development is the merest figment.

                     OTTIGER, Theologia fundamentalis (Freiburg, 1897); VACANT, Etudes Th ologiques sur la Concile
                     du Vatican (Paris, 1895); LEBACHELET, De l apolog tique traditionelle et l apolog tique moderne.
                     (Paris, 1897); DE BROGLIE, Religion et Critique (Paris, 1906); BLONDEL, Lettre sur les Exigences
                     de la Pens e moderne en mati re apolog tique in Annales de la Philos: Chr tienne (Paris. 1896). On
                     private revelations: SUAREZ, De Fide, disp. III, sect. 10; FRANZELIN, De Scriptura et Traditione,
                     Th. xxii (Rome, 1870); POULAIN, Graces of Interior Prayer, pt. IV, tr. (London, 1910). On
                     development of doctrine: BAINVEL, De magisterio vivo et traditione (Paris, 1905); VACANT, op. cit.,
                     II, p. 281 seq.; PINARD, art. Dogme in Dict. Apolog tique de la Foi Catholique, ed. D AL S (Paris,
                     1910); O DWYER, Cardinal Newman and the Encyclical Pascendi (London, 1908).

                     Among those who from one point of view or another have controverted the Christian doctrine of
                     Revelation the following may be mentioned: PAINE, Age of Reason (ed. 1910), 1 30; F. W.
                     NEWMAN, Phases of Faith (4th ed., London, 1854); SABATIER, Esquisse d une philosophie de la
                     religion, I, ii (Paris, 1902); PFLEIDERER, Religionsphilosophie auf geschichtlicher Grundlage
                     (Berlin, 1896), 493 seq.; LOISY, Autour d un petit livre (Paris, 1903), 192 sqq.; WILSON, art.
                     Revelation and Modern Thought in Cambridge Theol. Essays (London, 1905); TYRRELL, Through
                     Scylla and Charybdis (London, 1907), ii; MARTINEAU, Seat of Authority in Religion, III, ii (London,

                     G.H. JOYCE
                     Transcribed by Douglas J. Potter
                     Dedicated to the Sacred Heart of Jesus Christ

                                       The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume XIII
                                    Copyright © 1912 by Robert Appleton Company
                                    Online Edition Copyright © 1999 by Kevin Knight
                                  Nihil Obstat, February 1, 1912. Remy Lafort, D.D., Censor
                                 Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York
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