Revelation

I. MEANING OF REVELATION

Revelation may be defined as the communication of some truth by God to a

rational creature through means which are beyond the ordinary course of nature.

The truths revealed may be such as are otherwise inaccessible to the human

mind -- mysteries, which even when revealed, the intellect of man is incapable of

fully penetrating. But Revelation is not restricted to these. God may see fit to

employ supernatural means to affirm truths, the discovery of which is not per se

beyond the powers of reason. The essence of Revelation lies in the fact that it is

the direct speech of God to man. The mode of communication, however, may be

mediate. Revelation does not cease to be such if God's message is delivered to

us by a prophet, who alone is the recipient of the immediate communication.

Such in brief is the account of Revelation given in the Constitution "De Fide

Catholica" of the Vatican Council. The Decree "Lamentabili" (3 July, 1907), by its

condemnation of a contrary proposition, declares that the dogmas which the

Church proposes as revealed are "truths which have come down to us from

heaven" (veritates e coelo delapsoe) and not "an interpretation of religious facts

which the human mind has acquired by its own strenuous efforts" (prop., 22). It

will be seen that Revelation as thus explained differs clearly from:

inspiration such as is bestowed by God on the author of a sacred book;

for this, while involving a special illumination of the mind in virtue of which

the recipient conceives such thoughts as God desires him to commit to

writing, does not necessarily suppose a supernatural communication of

these truths;

from the illustrations which God may bestow from time to time upon any

of the faithful to bring home to the mind the import of some truth of religion

hitherto obscurely grasped; and,

from the Divine assistance by which the pope when acting as the

supreme teacher of the Church, is preserved from all error as to faith or

morals. The function of this assistance is purely negative: it need not

carry with it any positive gift of light to the mind. Much of the confusion in

which the discussion of Revelation in non-Catholic works is involved arises

from the neglect to distinguish it from one or other of these.

During the past century the Church has been called on to reject as erroneous

several views of Revelation irreconcilable with Catholic belief. Three of these may

here be noted.

The view of Anton Guenther (1783 1863). This writer denied that Revelation

could include mysteries strictly so-called, inasmuch as the human

intellect is capable of penetrating to the full all revealed truth. He taught,

further, that the meaning to be attached to revealed doctrines is

undergoing constant change as human knowledge grows and man's mind

develops; so that the dogmatic formul which are now true will gradually

cease to be so. His writings were put on the Index in 1857, and his

erroneous propositions definitively condemned in the decrees of the

Vatican Council.

the Modernist view (Loisy, Tyrrell). According to this school, there is no

such thing as Revelation in the sense of a direct communication from God

to man. The human soul reaching up towards the unknowable God is ever

endeavouring to interpret its sentiments in intellectual formul . The formul

it thus frames are our ecclesiastical dogmas. These can but symbolize

the Unknowable; they can give us no real knowledge regarding it. Such an

error is manifestly subversive of all belief, and was explicitly condemned

by the Decree "Lamentabili" and the Encyclical "Pascendi" (8 Sept.,

1907).

With the view just mentioned is closely connected the Pragmatist view of

M. Leroy ("Dogme et Critique", Paris, 2nd ed. 1907). Like the Modernists,

he sees in revealed dogmas simply the results of spiritual experience, but

holds their value to lie not in the fact that they symbolize the Unknowable,

but that they have practical value in pointing the way by which we may

best enjoy experience of the Divine. This view was condemned in the

same documents as the last mentioned.

II. POSSIBILITY OF REVELATION

The possibility of Revelation as above explained has been strenuously denied

from various points of view during the last century. For this reason the Church

held it necessary to issue special decrees on the subject in the Vatican Council.

Its antagonists may be divided into two classes according to the different

standpoints from which they direct their attack, viz:

Rationalists (under this class we include both Deist and Agnostic writers).

Those who adopt this standpoint rely in the main on two fundamental

objections: they either urge that the miraculous is impossible, and that

Revelation involves miraculous interposition on the part of the Deity; or

they appeal to the autonomy of reason, which it is maintained can only

accept as truths the results of its own activities.

Immanentists. To this class may be assigned all those whose objections

are based on Kantian and Hegelian doctrines as to the subjective

character of all our knowledge. The views of these writers frequently

involve a purely pantheistic doctrine. But even those who repudiate

pantheism, in place of the personal God, Ruler, and Judge of the world,

whom Christianity teaches, substitute the vague notion of the "Spirit"

immanent in all men, and regard all religious creeds as the attempts of

the human soul to find expression for its inward experience. Hence no

religion, whether pagan or Christian, is wholly false; but none can claim to

be a message from God free from any admixture of error. (Cf. Sabatier,

"Esquisse", etc., Bk. I, cap. ii.) Here too the autonomy of reason is

invoked as fatal to the doctrine of Revelation properly so called. In the face

of these objections, it is evident that the question of the possibility of

Revelation is at present one of the most vital portions of Christian

apologetic.

If the existence of a personal God be once established, the physical possibility

at least of Revelation is undeniable. God, who has endowed man with means to

communicate his thoughts to his fellows, cannot be destitute of the power to

communicate His own thoughts to us. [Martineau, it is true, denies that we

possess faculties either to receive or to authenticate a divine revelation

concerning the past or the future (Seat of Authority in Religion, p. 311); but such

an assertion is arbitrary and extravagant in the extreme.] However, numerous

difficulties have been urged on grounds other than that of physical possibility. In

estimating their value it seems desirable to distinguish three aspects of

Revelation, viz: as it makes known to us;

(1) truths of the natural law,

(2) mysteries of the faith,

(3) positive precepts, e.g. regarding Divine worship.

(1) The revelation of truths of the natural law is certainly not inconsistent with

God's wisdom. God so created man as to bestow on him endowments amply

sufficient for him to attain his last end. Had it been otherwise, the creation would

have been imperfect. If over and above this He decreed to make the attainment of

beatitude yet easier for man by placing within his reach a far simpler and far

more certain way of knowing the law on the observance of which his fate

depended, this is an argument for the Divine generosity; it does not disprove the

Divine wisdom. To assume, with certain Rationalists, that exceptional

intervention can only be explained on the ground that God was unable to

embrace His ultimate design in His original scheme is a mere petitio principii.

Further, the doctrine of original sin supplies an additional reason for such a

revelation of the natural law. That doctrine teaches us that man by the abuse of

his free will has rendered his attainment of salvation difficult. Though his

intellectual faculties are not radically vitiated, yet his grasp of truth is weakened;

his recognition of the moral law is constantly clouded by doubts and

questionings. Revelation gives to his mind the certainty he had lost, and so far

repairs the evils consequent on the catastrophe which had befallen him.

(2) Still more difficulty has been felt regarding mysteries. It is freely asserted that

a mystery is something repugnant to reason, and therefore something

intrinsically impossible. This objection rests on a mere misunderstanding of what

is signified by a mystery. In theological terminology a conception involves a

mystery when it is such that the natural faculties of the mind are unable to see

how its elements can coalesce. This does not imply anything contrary to reason.

A conception is only contrary to reason when the mind can recognize that its

elements are mutually exclusive, and therefore involve a contradiction in terms. A

more subtle objection is that urged by Dr. J. Caird, to the effect that every truth

that can be partially communicated to the mind by analogies is ultimately

capable of being fully grasped by the understanding. "Of all such representations,

unless they are purely illusory, it must hold good that implicitly and in

undeveloped form they contain rational thought and therefore thought which

human intelligence may ultimately free from its sensuous veil. . . . Nothing that is

absolutely inscrutable to reason can be made known to faith" (Philosophy of

Religion, p. 71). The objection rests on a wholly exaggerated view regarding the

powers of the human intellect. The cognitive faculty of any nature is proportionate

to its grade in the scale of being. The intelligence of a finite intellect can only

penetrate a finite object; it is incapable of comprehending the Infinite. The finite

types through which the Infinite is made known to it can never under any

circumstances lead to more than analogous knowledge. It is further frequently

urged that the revelation of what the mind cannot understand would be an act of

violence to the intellect; and that this faculty can only accept those truths whose

intrinsic reasonableness it recognizes. This assertion, based on the alleged

autonomy of reason, can only be met with denial. The function of the intellect is

to recognize and admit any truth which is adequately presented to it, whether

that truth be guaranteed by internal or by external criteria. The reason is not

deprived of its legitimate activity because the criteria are external. It finds ample

scope in weighing the arguments for the credibility of the fact asserted. The

existence of mysteries in the Christian religion was expressly taught by the

Vatican Council (De Fide Cath., cap. ii, can. ii). "If anyone shall say that no

mysteries properly so called are contained in the Divine revelation, but that all the

dogmas of the faith can be understood and proved from natural principles by

human reason duly cultivated -- let him be anathema."

(3) The older (Deist) School of Rationalists denied the possibility of a Divine

revelation imposing any laws other than those which natural religion enjoins on

man. These writers regarded natural religion as, so to speak, a political

constitution determining the Divine government of the universe, and held that God

could only act as its terms prescribed. This error likewise was proscribed at the

same time (De Fide Cath., cap. ii, can. ii). "If any one shall say that it is

impossible or that it is inexpedient that man should be instructed regarding God

and the worship to be paid to Him by Divine revelation -- let him be anathema."

It can hardly be questioned that the "autonomy of reasons" furnishes the main

source of the difficulties at present felt against Revelation in the Christian sense.

It seems desirable to indicate very briefly the various ways in which that principle

is understood. It is explained by M. Blondel, an eminent member of the

Immanentist School, as signifying that "nothing can enter into a man which does

not proceed from him, and which does not correspond in some manner to an

interior need of expansion; and that neither in the sphere of historic facts nor of

traditional doctrine, nor of commands imposed by authority, can any truth rank

as valid for a man or any precept as obligatory, unless it be in some way

autonomous and autochthonous" (Lettre sur les exigences, etc., p. 601).

Although M. Blondel has in his own case reconciled this principle with the

acceptance of Catholic belief, yet it may readily be seen that it affords an easy

ground for the denial not merely of the possibility of external Revelation, but of

the whole historic basis of Christianity. The origin of this erroneous doctrine is to

be found in the fact that within the sphere of the natural speculative reason,

truths which are received purely on external authority, and which are in no way

connected with principles already admitted, can scarcely be said to form part of

our knowledge. Science asks for the inner reason of things and can make no use

of truths save in so far as it can reach the principles from which they flow. The

extension of this to religious truths is an error directly traceable to the

assumption of the eighteenth-century philosophers that there are no religious

truths save those which the human intellect can attain unaided. The principle is,

however, sometimes applied with a less extensive signification. It may be

understood to involve no more than that reason cannot be compelled to admit

any religious doctrine or any moral obligation merely because they possess

extrinsic guarantees of truth; they must in every case be able to justify their

validity on intrinsic grounds. Thus Prof. J. Caird writes: "Neither moral nor

religious ideas can be simply transferred to the human spirit in the form of fact,

nor can they be verified by any evidence outside of or lower than themselves"

(Fundamental Ideas of Christianity, p. 31). A somewhat different meaning again

is implied in the canon of the Vatican Council in which the right of the intellect to

claim absolute independence (autonomy) is denied. "If anyone shall say that

human reason is independent in such wise that faith cannot be commanded it by

God -- let him be anathema" (De Fide Cath., cap. iii, can. i). This canon is

directed against the position maintained as already noted by the older

Rationalists and the Deists, that human reason is amply sufficient without

exterior assistance to attain to absolute truth in all matters of religion (cf. Vacant,

"Etudes Théologiques", I, 572; II, 387).

III. NECESSITY OF REVELATION

Can it be said that Revelation is necessary to man? There can be no question as

to its necessity, if it be admitted that God destines man to attain a supernatural

beatitude which surpasses the exigencies of his natural endowments. In that

case God must needs reveal alike the existence of that supernatural end and the

means by which we are to attain it. But is Revelation necessary even in order

that man should observe the precepts of the natural law? If our race be viewed in

its present condition as history displays it, the answer can only be that it is,

morally speaking, impossible for men unassisted by Revelation, to attain by their

natural powers such a knowledge of that law as is sufficient to the right ordering

of life. In other words, Revelation is morally necessary. Absolute necessity we do

not assert. Man, Catholic theology teaches, possesses the requisite faculties to

discover the natural law. Luther indeed asserted that man's intellect had become

hopelessly obscured by original sin, so that even natural truth was beyond his

reach. And the Traditionalists of the nineteenth century (Bautain, Bonnetty, etc.)

also fell into error, teaching that man was incapable of arriving at moral and

religious truth apart from Revelation. The Church, on the contrary, recognizes the

capacity of human reason and grants that here and there pagans may have

existed, who had freed themselves from prevalent errors, and who had attained to

such a knowledge of the natural law as would suffice to guide them to the

attainment of beatitude. But she teaches nevertheless that this can only be the

case as regards a few, and that for the bulk of mankind Revelation is necessary.

That this is so may be shown both from the facts of history and from the nature

of the case. As regards the testimony of history, it is notorious that even the

most civilized of pagan races have fallen into the grossest errors regarding the

natural law; and from these it may safely be asserted they would never have

emerged. Certainly the schools of philosophy would not have enabled them to do

so; for many of these denied even such fundamental principles of the natural law

as the personality of God and the freedom of the will. Again, by the very nature of

the case, the difficulties involved in the attainment of the requisite knowledge are

insuperable. For men to be able to attain such a knowledge of the natural law as

will enable them to order their lives rightly, the truths of that law must be so plain

that the mass of men can discover them without long delay, and possess a

knowledge of them which will be alike free from uncertainty and secure from

serious error. No reasonable man will maintain that in the case of the greater part

of mankind this is possible. Even the most vital truths are called in question and

are met by serious objections. The separation of truth from error is a work

involving time and labour. For this the majority of men have neither inclination nor

opportunity. Apart from the security which Revelation gives they would reject an

obligation both irksome and uncertain. It results that a revelation even of the

natural law is for man in his present state a moral necessity.

IV. CRITERIA OF REVELATION

The fact that Revelation is not merely possible but morally necessary is in itself a

strong argument for the existence of a revelation, and imposes on all men the

strict obligation of examining the credentials of a religion which presents itself

with prima facie marks of truth. On the other hand if God has conferred a

revelation on men, it stands to reason that He must have attached to it plain and

evident criteria enabling even the unlettered to recognize His message for what it

is, and to distinguish it from all false claimants.

The criteria of Revelation are either external or internal: (1) External criteria

consist in certain signs attached to the revelation as a divine testimony to its

truth, ee.g., miracles. (2) Internal criteria are those which are found in the nature

of the doctrine itself in the manner in which it was presented to the world, and in

the effects which it produces on the soul. These are distinguished into negative

and positive criteria. (a) The immunity of the alleged revelation from any teaching,

speculative or moral, which is manifestly erroneous or self-contradictory, the

absence of all fraud on the part of those who deliver it to the world, provide

negative internal criteria. (b) Positive internal criteria are of various kinds. One

such is found in the beneficent effects of the doctrine and in its power to meet

even the highest aspirations which man can frame. Another consists in the

internal conviction felt by the soul as to the truth of the doctrine (Suarez, "De

Fide", IV, sect. 5, n. 9.) In the last century there was in certain schools of

thought a manifest tendency to deny the value of all external criteria. This was

largely due to the Rationalist polemic against miracles. Not a few non-Catholic

divines anxious to make terms with the enemy adopted this attitude. They

allowed that miracles are useless as a foundation for faith, and that they form on

the contrary one of the chief difficulties which lie in faith's path. Faith, they

admitted, must be presupposed before the miracle can be accepted. Hence

these writers held the sole criterion of faith to lie in inward experience -- in the

testimony of the Spirit. Thus Schleiermacher says: "We renounce altogether any

attempt to demonstrate the truth and the necessity of the Christian religion. On

the contrary we assume that every Christian before he commences inquiries of

this kind is already convinced that no other form of religion but the Christian can

harmonize with his piety" (Glaubenslehre, n. 11). The Traditionalists by denying

the power of human reason to test the grounds of faith were driven to fall back on

the same criterion (cf. Lamennais, "Pensées Diverses", p. 488).

This position is altogether untenable. The testimony afforded by inward

experience is undoubtedly not to be neglected. Catholic doctors have always

recognized its value. But its force is limited to the individual who is the subject of

it. It cannot be employed as a criterion valid for all; for its absence is no proof

that the doctrine is not true. Moreover, of all the criteria it is the one with regard

to which there is most possibility of deception. When truth mingled with error is

presented to the mind, it often happens that the whole teaching, false and true

alike, is believed to have a Divine guarantee, because the soul has recognized

and welcomed the truth of some one doctrine, e.g., the Atonement. Taken alone

and apart from objective proof it conveys but a probability that the revelation is

true. Hence the Vatican Council expressly condemns the error of those who

teach it to be the only criterion (De Fide Cath., cap. iii, can. iii).

The perfect agreement of a religious doctrine with the teachings of reason and

natural law, its power to satisfy, and more than satisfy, the highest aspirations of

man, its beneficent influence both as regards public and private life, provide us

with a more trustworthy test. This is a criterion which has often been applied with

great force on behalf of the claims of the Catholic Church to be the sole guardian

of God's Revelation. These qualities indeed appertain in so transcendent a

degree to the teaching of the Church, that the argument must needs carry

conviction to an earnest and truth-seeking mind. Another criterion which at first

sight bears some resemblance to this claims a mention here. It is based upon

the theory of Immanence and has of recent years been strenuously advocated by

certain of the less extreme members of the Modernist School. These writers urge

that the vital needs of the soul imperatively demand, as their necessary

complement, Divine co-operation, supernatural grace, and even the supreme

magisterium of the Church. To these needs the Catholic religion alone

corresponds. And this correspondence with our vital needs is, they hold, the one

sure criterion of truth. The theory is altogether inconsistent with Catholic dogma.

It supposes that the Christian Revelation and the gift of grace are not free gifts

from God, but something of which the nature of man is absolutely exigent; and

without which it would be incomplete. It is a return to the errors of Baius. (Denz.

1021, etc.)

While the Church, as we have said, is far from undervaluing internal criteria, she

has always regarded external criteria as the most easily recognizable and the

most decisive. Hence the Vatican Council teaches: "In order that the obedience

of our faith might be agreeable to reason, God has willed that to the internal aids

of the Holy Spirit, there should be joined external proofs of His Revelation, viz:

Divine works (facta divina), especially miracles and prophecy, which inasmuch

as they manifestly display the omnipotence and the omniscience of God are

most certain signs of a Divine revelation and are suited to the understanding of

all" (De Fide Cath., cap. iii). As an instance of a work evidently Divine and yet

other than miracle or prophecy, the council instances the Catholic Church,

which, "by reason of the marvellous manner of its propagation, its surprising

sanctity, its inexhaustible fruitfulness in all good works, its catholic unity and its

invincible stability, is a mighty and perpetual motive of credibility and an

irrefragable testimony to its own divine legation" (l. c.). The truth of the teaching

of the council regarding external criteria is plain to any unprejudiced mind.

Granted the presence of the negative criteria, external guarantees establish the

Divine origin of a revelation as nothing else can do. They are, so to say, a seal

affixed by the hand of God Himself, and authenticating the work as His. (For a

fuller treatment of their apologetic value, and for a discussion of objections, see

MIRACLES; APOLOGETICS.)

V. THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION

It remains here to distinguish the Christian Revelation or "deposit of faith" from

what are termed private revelations. This distinction is of importance: for while the

Church recognizes that God has spoken to His servants in every age, and still

continues thus to favour chosen souls, she is careful to distinguish these

revelations from the Revelation which has been committed to her charge, and

which she proposes to all her members for their acceptance. That Revelation was

given in its entirety to Our Lord and His Apostles. After the death of the last of

the twelve it could receive no increment. It was, as the Church calls it, a deposit

-- "the faith once delivered to the saints" (Jude, 2) -- for which the Church was to

"contend" but to which she could add nothing. Thus, whenever there has been

question of defining a doctrine, whether at Nicæa, at Trent, or at the Vatican, the

sole point of debate has been as to whether the doctrine is found in Scripture or

in Apostolic tradition. The gift of Divine assistance (see I), sometimes

confounded with Revelation by the less instructed of anti-Catholic writers, merely

preserves the supreme pontiff from error in defining the faith; it does not enable

him to add jot or tittle to it. All subsequent revelations conferred by God are

known as private revelations, for the reason that they are not directed to the

whole Church but are for the good of individual members alone, They may indeed

be a legitimate object for our faith; but that will depend on the evidence in each

particular case. The Church does not propose them to us as part of her

message. It is true that in certain cases she has given her approbation to certain

private revelations. This, however, only signifies:

that there is nothing in them contrary to the Catholic Faith or to the moral

law, and,

that there are sufficient indications of their truth to justify the faithful in

attaching credence to them without being guilty of superstition or of

imprudence.

It may however be further asked, whether the Christian Revelation does not

receive increment through the development of doctrine. During the last half of the

nineteenth century the question of doctrinal development was widely debated.

Owing to Guenther's erroneous teaching that the doctrines of the faith assume a

new sense as human science progresses, the Vatican Council declared once for

all that the meaning of the Church's dogmas is immutable (De Fide Cath., cap.

iv, can. iii). On the other hand it explicitly recognizes that there is a legitimate

mode of development, and cites to that effect (op. cit., cap. iv) the words of

Vincent of Lirins: "Let understanding science and wisdom [regarding the Church's

doctrine] progress and make large increase in each and in all, in the individual

and in the whole Church, as ages and centuries advance: but let it be solely in

its own order, retaining, that is, the same dogma, the same sense, the same

import" (Commonit. 28). Two of the most eminent theological writers of the

period, Cardinal Franzelin and Cardinal Newman, have on very different lines dealt

with the progress and nature of this development. Cardinal Franzelin in his "De

Divina Traditione et Scriptura" (pt. XXII VI) has principally in view the Hegelian

theories of Guenther. He consequently lays the chief stress on the identity at all

points of the intellectual datum, and explains development almost exclusively as

a process of logical deduction. Cardinal Newman wrote his "Essay on the

Development of Christian Doctrine" in the course of the two years (1843 45)

immediately preceding his reception into the Catholic Church. He was called on

to deal with different adversaries, viz., the Protestants who justified their

separation from the main body of Christians on the ground that Rome had

corrupted primitive teaching by a series of additions. In that work he examines in

detail the difference between a corruption and a development. He shows how a

true and fertile idea is endowed with a vital and assimilative energy of its own, in

virtue of which, without undergoing the least substantive change, it attains to an

ever completer expression, as the course of time brings it into contact with new

aspects of truth or forces it into collision with new errors: the life of the idea is

shown to be analogous to an organic development. He provides a series of tests

distinguishing a true development from a corruption, chief among them being the

preservation of type, and the continuity of principles; and then, applying the tests

to the case of the additions of Roman teaching, shows that these have the marks

not of corruptions but of true and legitimate developments. The theory, though

less scholastic in its form than that of Franzelin, is in perfect conformity with

orthodox belief. Newman no less than his Jesuit contemporary teaches that the

whole doctrine, alike in its later as in its earlier forms, was contained in the

original revelation given to the Church by Our Lord and His Apostles, and that its

identity is guaranteed to us by the infallible magisterium of the Church. The claim

of certain Modernist writers that their views on the evolution of dogma were

connected with Newman's theory of development is the merest figment.

OTTIGER, Theologia fundamentalis (Freiburg, 1897); VACANT, Etudes Th ologiques sur la Concile

du Vatican (Paris, 1895); LEBACHELET, De l apolog tique traditionelle et l apolog tique moderne.

(Paris, 1897); DE BROGLIE, Religion et Critique (Paris, 1906); BLONDEL, Lettre sur les Exigences

de la Pens e moderne en mati re apolog tique in Annales de la Philos: Chr tienne (Paris. 1896). On

private revelations: SUAREZ, De Fide, disp. III, sect. 10; FRANZELIN, De Scriptura et Traditione,

Th. xxii (Rome, 1870); POULAIN, Graces of Interior Prayer, pt. IV, tr. (London, 1910). On

development of doctrine: BAINVEL, De magisterio vivo et traditione (Paris, 1905); VACANT, op. cit.,

II, p. 281 seq.; PINARD, art. Dogme in Dict. Apolog tique de la Foi Catholique, ed. D AL S (Paris,

1910); O DWYER, Cardinal Newman and the Encyclical Pascendi (London, 1908).

Among those who from one point of view or another have controverted the Christian doctrine of

Revelation the following may be mentioned: PAINE, Age of Reason (ed. 1910), 1 30; F. W.

NEWMAN, Phases of Faith (4th ed., London, 1854); SABATIER, Esquisse d une philosophie de la

religion, I, ii (Paris, 1902); PFLEIDERER, Religionsphilosophie auf geschichtlicher Grundlage

(Berlin, 1896), 493 seq.; LOISY, Autour d un petit livre (Paris, 1903), 192 sqq.; WILSON, art.

Revelation and Modern Thought in Cambridge Theol. Essays (London, 1905); TYRRELL, Through

Scylla and Charybdis (London, 1907), ii; MARTINEAU, Seat of Authority in Religion, III, ii (London,

1890).

G.H. JOYCE

Transcribed by Douglas J. Potter

Dedicated to the Sacred Heart of Jesus Christ

The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume XIII

Nihil Obstat, February 1, 1912. Remy Lafort, D.D., Censor

Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York

The Catholic Encyclopedia: NewAdvent.org